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I 
I. The focal point of practical reasoning is action, as the 
focal point of empirical reasoning is observation. Perceptual 
takings or 'judgments' are the thoughts which typically arise 
from the impact of the world on our mind through our sensory 
capacities. Volitions are the thoughts which typically impinge 
on the world through our motor capacities. 
2. Intentions can be thought of, somewhat metaphorically, 
as practical commitments. Volitions can correspondingly be 
thought of as practical commitments to do something here and 
flow, and hence as a special case of commitments to do some-
thing at sometime or other. If one comes to intend to do a 
certain action in the future, say ten minutes from now, whether 
impulsively or as a result of deliberation and decision, then, 
unless one changes one's mind, the intention becomes a here· 
now intention when one realizes the ten minutes havt'! gone by. 
More generally, if one has the intention to do a certain action 
if a certain circumstance should obtain, then, unless one 
changes one's mind, the intention becomes an unconditional 
intention when the circumstance is believed to obtain. 
3. I shall assume that intentions uniformly find their lin-
guistic expressions in the use of the auxiliary verb 'shall.' The 
intention to do A in ten minutes would be expressed by 
I shall do A in ten minutes. 
The intention to do A when and if C obtains would be ex-
pressed by 
I shall do A when and if C.1 
4. Intentions are not limited to intentions to do, whether 
now, or later, or on the condition that a certain circumstance 
obtains. There are also intentions that something be the case. 
The latter, however, are intentions, practical commitments, 
only by virtue of their conceptual tie with intentions to do. 
Roughly 
1 It will be convenient to drop the 'when" and assume, for simplicity's sake, 
that that action in accordance wnh such intentions takes place immediately on 
recognizing the circumstance to be C. 
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It shall be the case that-p 
has the sense, when made explicit, of 
(Ceteris paribus) I shall do that which is necessary to 
make it the case that-p. 
5. It is important to see that I can not only intend to do 
something myself, I can also intend that someone else do some· 
thing, i.e. that it be the case that he does it. Intentions pertain· 
ing to the actions of others are not 'intentions to do' in the 
primary sense in which 
I shall do A 
is an intention to do. Thus, in spite of their superficial simi· 
larity, 
Tom shall do A 
and 
I shall do A 
do not have the same conceptual structure. The former has the 
form 
(Ceteris paribus) I shall do that which is necessary to 
make it the case that Tom does A 
whereas the latter cannot, without the absurdity of an infinite 
regress, be supposed to have the form 
(Ceteris paribus) I shall do that which is necessary to 
make it the case that I do A.2 
6. These considerations highlight the fact that the intention 
expressed by a 'shall' statement is invariably the speaker's in-
tention. Thus 
Tom shall do A 
expresses the speaker's intention that Tom do A. This 'first 
person' feature of intentions consists in part in their relation 
to the 
I shall do 
which can become the commitment to do something here and 
now which is volition. 
II 
7. Intentions imply intentions just as beliefs imply beliefs. 
This point must be carefully made. We must distinguish be-
tween intentions as states of intending and intentions as what 
"This is not to say, however, that 
It shall be the case that Tom does A 
has no first person parallel which would be subsumable with it under common 
practical principles. It is merely to emphasize the conceptual primacy of inten· 
tions to do even in the case of intentions that someone do. 
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is intended, just as we distinguish between states of believing 
and what is believed, the so-called 'content' of the believing. 
In the latter case we distinguish between the implications of 
the content of a belief and the implications of the state of 
having a belief with that content. Thus the belief which would 
be expressed by the conjunction of Peano's postulates (P) 
implies the belief which would be expressed by any arithmetical 
theorem (T), however recondite, in the sense that the one 
belief content implies the other. Yet, obviously, the existence 
of this implication does not carry with it the idea that 
Jones believes P implies Jones believes T. 
8. Corresponding distinctions obtain in the case of inten-
tions. Thus, when I speak, as I shall, of one intention 11 im-
plying another intention I~. I shall be speaking about an im-
plication between two intention-contents. That in this sense 
an intention It implies an intention 12 does not carry with it 
the idea that 
Jones intends It implies Jones intends 12• 
An ideally rational being would intend the implications of his 
intentions, just as he would believe the implications of his 
beliefs.3 
9. Philosophers analyse the logical relations of belief-con-
tents by determining the logical relations of the factual state-
ments which express them. In this lecture I shall explore the 
logical relations of intention-contents by exploring the implica-
tions of the practical statements which express them. 
III 
10. Philosophically, the most important single feature of 
the logic of intentions is that it is parasitical upon the logic of 
beliefs. This fact can be expressed as the principle 
'It shall be the case that P' implies 'It shall be the case 
that Q' ~ 'P' implies 'Q.' 
The technical elaboration of this principle would transcend the 
scope of this lecture. I have argued elsewhere4 that, for example, 
the reasoning 
• It is, however, a familiar fact that when we become aware of the implications 
of our beliefs we often change our mind. It is equally true that when we become 
aware of the implications of our intentions we often, shall I say, change our hearL 
• '"Imperatives, Intentions and the Logic of 'Ought'," in Morality and tile 
l.anguage of Conduct, t.-dited by Hector·Neri Castaneda and George Nakhnikian, 
Detroit, 196!1, pp. 17!1·6: 190-1. Also, "Thought and Action," in Freedom and 
Determinism, cdtted by Keith Lehrer, New York, 1966, pp. 110 If. 
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I shaH do A, ifp 
p 
So, I shaH do A 
can be transformed to fit the foJlowing principle of inference: 
'Shall [if p, my doing A]' implies (relatively to the as-
sumption that p) 'ShaH [my doing A]'. 
11. If 'P' implies 'Q,' then it is unreasonable to believe that 
P is the case without believing that Q is the case. (Though, as 
noted above, in point of fact one may well believe the former 
without believing the latter). Similarly if 
'It shall be the case that P' implies 'It shall be the case 
that Q' 
it is unreasonable to intend that P be the case without intend-
ing that Q be the case. (Though, again, in point of fact one may 
very wen intend the former without intending the latter and 
may even intend that the latter not be the case.) 
IV 
12. The central theme of Kant's ethical theory is, in our 
terminology, the reasonableness of intentions. In what sense 
or senses, if any, can intentions be said to be reasonable, i.e. have 
a claim on the assent of a rational being? Kant clearly construes 
this task as parallel to the task of defining in what sense or 
senses, if any, beliefs can be said to be reasonable, i.e. have a 
claim on the assent of a rational being. As in his epistemology, 
Kant sides with the rationalists against both the empiricist and 
the skeptic-but gives rationalism that twist which makes all 
the difference. In both areas his insights were so revolutionary 
that they are even now just beginning to be absorbed. 
13. The primary distinction Kant draws with respect to the 
reasonableness of intentions, is that between 'hypothetical' (or, 
as I prefer to put it, 'relative') and 'categorical' reasonableness. 
The simplest examples of intentions whose reasonableness is 
purely 'relative' are provided by what Kant calls 'hypothetical 
imperatives'. 
14. A hypothetical imperative (the term 'imperative' is, of 
course, a misnomer) has the form 
If S wants to bring about E, he ought to do A 
or, more explicitly, 
(Since S is in C) 
If S wants to bring about E, he ought to do A 
since the assertion of a hypothetical imperative in the unquali-
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fled form presupposes that the person in question is manifestly 
in a circumstance which makes the imperative relevant. 
15. What does the hypothetical imperative assert? The dis-
tinctions we have drawn enable an answer which is free from 
the puzzles which have traditionally hovered around this ques-
tion. It asserts that (since S is in C) the intention-content 
pertaining to his bringing about E implies the intention-con-
tent pertaining to his doing A. 
In other words 
'I, S, shall bring about E' implies '1, S, shall do A' 
or equivalently 
'I shall bring about E' implies (for S) 'I shalt do A'. 
16. Notice that it is important to use the personal pronoun 
'I,' for the implied intention is a 'shall do'. Furthermore, since 
all of us are Ts, but only S is presumed to be in C, we write 
'implies (for S),' for the implication hinges on S's being in C. 
(For a deeper analysis of the reason for relativising the impli-
cation see V-27 below.) 
17. In the terminology suggested above, the hypothetical 
imperative asserts that (since S is in C) the intention which he 
would express by saying 
I shall do A 
is reasonable relative to the intention which he would express 
by saying 
I shall bring about E. 
18. One merit of using the term 'relative' to characterize the 
reasonableness of the above intention, is that it enables us to 
avoid confusing the reasonableness (for S) of the intention to do 
A relative to the intention to bring about E, with a supposed 
reasonableness (for S) of the intention to do A on the hypothesis 
that he intends to bring about E.r. This confusion generates 
the mistaken idea that the hypothetical imperative authorizes S 
(since he is in C) to reason 
I intend to bring about E 
So, I shall do A6 
"This mistake is a consequence of the failure to bear in mind that distinction 
between what is implied by an intention-content and what is implied by the state 
of having an intenuon with that content. 
0 This argument clearly presup~. for its validity, the principle that it is 
reasonable to do whatever is implied by the content of an intention we happen 
to have. Explicitly formulated this principle would read 
If x has an intention of content I, and I implies (for x) 
'I shall do A.' then x ought to do A 
and this can be readily seen to be a false categorical imperative. 
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whereas the hypothetical imperative actually says that (given 
that S is in C) a reasoning on his part to the effect that 
I shall bring about E 
So, I shall do A 
would be valid, in that the premise does (given that S is in C) 
imply the conclusion. 
19. Thus the reasonableness invoked by a hypothetical im-
perative is the reasonableness of a conclusion intention relative 
to the premise intention in a (possible) piece of practical rea-
soning. It does not commit itself concerning the reasonableness 
of either the premise intention or the conclusion intention 
fJer se. 
20. Let me prepare the way for the next stage of the argu-
ment by reminding you of the distinction between the validity 
and the goodness of arguments in the domain of theoretical 
reasoning. An argument can be valid, but fail to be good, by 
having a false premise. To say that it is valid, is, in our ter-
minology, to say that its conclusion is reasonable relative to its 
premise. To say that it is good is to add that its premise is rea-
sonable-for, I shall assume, truth is a special case of reasonable-
ness. A true proposition is one which has a certain claim to be 
assented to by a rational being. Just how this claim is to be 
analyzed is the problem of truth which, fortunately, must be left 
to other occasions. 
21. One would expect, then, that a good practical argument 
is one in which the conclusion intention is not only implied by 
the premise intention, so that it is reasonable relative to the 
premise, as in the case of arguments authorized by hypothetical 
imperatives, but also one in which the premise intention is rea-
sonable per se. And, indeed, Kant is clearly looking for a prop-
erty of intentions which corresponds to truth. In short, he is 
attempting to discover what might make practical arguments 
good as opposed to merely valid. My purpose in this lecture 
is to show that he took us to the very threshold of success. 
v 
22. But before we make a frontal assault on the problem 
of what might make an intention categorically reasonable, or, 
to use Kant's terminology, valid, we must clarify and broaden 
the concept of the relative reasonableness of an intention. 
23. Hypothetical imperatives typically rest on causal con-
nections, and, like most singular causal statements in everyday 
8 
life, they a re rarely if ever the direct application of a general 
causa l law. Thus 
If J ones wants a drin k, he ought to go to the next corner 
is no t the application of a supposed genera l law to the cfTcct that 
If anyone is to get a drink he must go to the next corner. 
24·. W e have already noted that hypothe tical imperatives 
typically presuppose that the person in qu estion is in a certain 
circumstance. This point must now be elaborated. The first 
step is to bring this presupposition into the content of th e im . 
peratives, thus 
(Si nce S is in C) 
If S wants to bring about£, he ough t to do A 
becomes 
If S wants to bring about £, he ought to do A, if he is inC 
and S is in C. 
Let us focus our attention on the complex if statement, and 
neglect the conjoined assertion. 
25. There are many ways in which genera l lawlike state-
ments can be idealized. Thus it is often required that a 
'genuine' lawlike statement contain no reference to particula r 
objects, times or places. Whether o r not idea l science \\'Oulcl g ive 
us such, it is clear that we often have to settle Eor less. Now th e 
nomologicals wi th which we are concerned arc those which can 
generate general hypothetical imperatives. These nomologica ls 
concern the causa ll y necessa ry condi tions for bringing about a 
ccrtn in ki nd of state of aiTairs in a certain kind o[ circumstance.i 
T hey have the form 
Doing A1 if C1 is causa lly necessary to realize to the rea l i-
zation of Ek. 
Or, putting it in terms of causa l implication, we have the fam· 
ily of implications, 
'x brings about E~<' implies 'x does A1 if in C/ . 
These impl ications, which for obvious reasons can be ca lled 
' instrumenta l implica lions' arc 'binding on all rational beings' 
in the sense that as empirical generaliz.:·'ltions, the ir inductive 
soundness is inclependcm of th e desires and incli nations or 
cultural ties of specific individuals or groups. Transposed into 
• The complexity of the iustrumeut al nomologicals which arc rclcvam 10 !he 
IJringing about in social coutexts of any btl! the most trivial ends musl con· 
swntly be home in mind. T he simplicity of the schematic letters 'A.' ·c· and 
'1·:: should not blind us to thi ~ fact. We must take into accounl 1he effects of 
our action on t he actions of others as well as the effect of the actiun~ o ( others 
011 the outcomes of our own. 
practical discourse as a general hypothetical imperative, they 
become 
'I shall bring about Ek' implies 'I shall do A" if inC/. 
Even after this transposition, the implications remain binding 
on all rational beings. Any restriction belongs in the circum-
stance clause. Thus to restrict it to WASPs is to include the 
characteristic of being a WASP in CJ· For if being a WASP 
is irrelevant to bringing about Et by doing A1 in CJ, then there 
is no point in including it anywhere; while if it is relevant, the 
relevance is a causal one and belongs in the content of the im-
plication and not as a limitation on those for whom it holds. 
26. Thus a limitation of the general hypothetical impera-
tive toW ASPs will not take the form 
but 
'I shall bring about Ek' implies (for all WASPs) 'I shall 
do A, inC/ 
'I shall bring about Ek' implies 'I shall do A1 if in CJu' 
where 'Cm' differs from 'C/ by including the additional char-
acteristic of being a WASP. In this sense, general hypothetical 
imperatives can be said to hold "for all rational beings." They 
are simply the transposition into practical discourse of empirical 
instrumental generalizations. 
27. Notice, however, that although general hypothetical 
imperatives "ho1d for all rational beings", there is an important 
sense in which each such imperative formulates not one single 
implication but a family of implications, one for each rational 
being. This complication reflects the fact that 'I' is a sys-
tematically ambiguous term. Thus, general hypothetical im-
peratives have the form 
'I shall bring about Ek' implies (for each rational being) 
'I shall do A~o if in C/. 
A general hypothetical imperative asserts that each rational 
being can validly argue 
I {Tom) shall bring about Ek 
So I (Tom) shall do A1 if in CJ 
I (Dick) shall bring about E~c 
So I {Dick) shall do A1 if in CJ 
etc. 
VI 
28. Let us now make a preliminary attempt to understand 
what it might mean to say of an intention that it is 'categorically 
reasonable' or 'categorically valid.' 
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29. Let us suppose that in the circumstance in which I now 
find myself I ought to do a certain kind of action A. The fol-
lowing categorical ought statement, we shall suppose is true. 
I ought to do A. 
Standing behind this categorical statement, however, is a condi-
tion of the form 'since (or because) I am in C,' we are thus led 
to the conditional ought statement 
If I am in C, I ought to do A. 
This in turn points in the direction of 
Anybody ought to do A, if he is in C 
but before attempting to understand the logical status of the 
reference to anybody, let us dwell for a moment on the first 
person conditional. 
30. The first point to be made is that the antecedent of this 
conditional refers to a circumstance rather than, as in the case 
of 
If I want to bring about E, I ought to do A 
to an intention. Thus if the ought statement tells us that the 
intention to do A is reasonable, it does not tell us, at least ex-
plicitly, that it is reasonable relative to another intention. Its 
explicit message is that the intention to do A is reasonable rela-
tive to the condition of being in C. On the other hand, if we 
accept, as we have, the principle that intentions can only be 
derived from other intentions, this reasonableness points to the 
argument 
I shall do A, if I am in C 
I am inC 
So, I shall do A 
in other words, implicitly the reasonableness of 'I shall do A' is 
relative not only to the circumstance, but to the conditional 
intention 
I shall do A, if I am in C. 
It is, therefore, this intention which must be categorically rea-
sonable, if the original ought statement is to express a categori-
cal imperative. 
31. We are thus led to the idea that 
I ought to do A, if I am in C 
is equivalent to 
'I shall do A, if I am in C' is categorically reasonable. 
Note that in this statement categorical reasonableness is pred-
icated of a conditional intention. 'Categorical' in the sense 
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which applies to reasonableness must not be confused with 
'categorical' as a dassification of propositional forms. 
32. But what are we to make of the idea that an intention 
of the form 
I shall do A, if I am inC 
can be categorically reasonable? Obviously the reasonableness 
does not consist in the logical form of the intention. Intentions 
of this form do not show themselves to be sound, for example, 
by unpacking into tautological intentions such as 
I shall either stay or go, if I am threatened, 
or unsound by unpacking into contradictary intentions such as 
I shall stay and go, if I am threatened. 
33. But how can the specific subject matter of an intention 
be involved in its reasonableness, without turning the latter 
into a disguised form of the relative reasonableness asserted by 
a hypothetical imperative? Curiously enough, the key to the 
answer is found by seeing how close we can come to capturing 
the distinctively categorical reasonableness of morally sound 
intentions by construing it as a special case of the relative rea-
sonableness ascribed to intentions by hypothetical imperatives. 
34. Is there a hypothetical imperative in the neighborhood 
which has a moral ring to it? The obvious candidate is 
If S wants to maximize the general welfare (GW), S 
ought to do A1 if S is in C1• 
Notice that this hypothetical imperative combines the two 
modes of conditionality, expressed, respectively, by 'if S wants' 
and 'if S is in C'. According to our analysis, this hypothetical 
imperative tells us that 
'I shall maximize GW' implies (for S) 'I shall do A if I 
am inC' 
The implication is, as we have seen, one of our special kind we 
have called 'instrumental.' And if the implication holds for S, 
it holds for any rational being, for we are supposing, as before, 
that the hypothetical imperative is simply the transposition 
into practical discourse of an inductively established empirical 
generalization. 
35. This complex hypothetical imperative as such asserts 
the reasonableness of the conditional intention 
I shall do A, if I am in C 
relative to the intention 
I shall maximize GW. 
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f 
We can now point out that if the antecedent intention was itself 
categorically reasonable, and if, as we have been assuming, 
categorical reasonableness is the practical counterpart of truth, 
it would follow that the co·rzsequent itllention was itself cate-
gorically 1·easonable. 
36. It has been easy to assume that relative and categorical 
reasonableness are incompatible; that an intention can have 
one or the other, but not both.11 This assumption is simply false. 
37. To bring out the implications of this point, remember 
that a good theoretical argument is one in which (a) the con-
clusion is reasonable relative to the premise, and (b) the premise 
itself is categorically reasonable, i.e. true. Implication preserves 
truth in theoretical arguments. We should explore the possi-
bility that it preserves categorical reasonableness in practical 
arguments. If so, then, an intention can be categorically rea-
sonable, and yet derivative from another intention-provided, 
of course, that the latter in turn is categorically reasonable. 
38. Categorical reasonableness must not be confused with 
intrinsic reasonableness. The confusion between these two has 
been even more damaging to Kant exegesis, than the tendency 
to suppose that a categorically reasonable intention cannot be 
conditional in its logical form. On the other hand even if 
categorical reasonableness is not the same as intrinsic reason-
ableness, we are faced with the fact that if there arc to be 
derivative categorically reasonable intentions, there must be 
one or more intentions whose categorically reasonableness is 
non-derivative or intrinsic. Are any to be found? 
39. What of the antecedent of the above complex hypotheti-
cal imperative 
I shall maximize the GW? 
It is a worthy intention, one that we should encourage people 
to have-though not, as Kant emphasizes, at the expense of the 
sense of duty. Yet it does not seem to have any feature which 
calls for the predicate 'intrinsically and categorically reasonable.' 
VII 
40. Let us continue to beat about in the neighboring bushes. 
The first thing to note is that the instrumental nomologicals on 
which the above complex hypothetical imperatives rest generate 
not only hypothetical impertaives, but other practical implica-
• Of course, if an intention is merely relatively or hypothetically reasonable, 
it cannot be categorically reasonable as well. 
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tions which, though closely related, are not in the strict Kantian 
sense hypothetical imperatives. For not all statements to the 
effect that one intention implies another can be put in the form 
of a hypothetical imperative, at least if we tie this term to Kant's 
paradigms. 
41. To develop this point, we must remember that not all 
intentions are intentions to do. There are also intentions that 
something be the case. And if the existence of one state of 
affairs causally implies the existence of another, then the inten-
tion that the one obtain causally implies the intention that the 
other obtain. 
42. Thus the instrumental nomologicals which generate the 
general hypothetical imperatives 
'I shall maximize GW' implies (for each rational being) 
'I shall do A., if I am in C1' 
also generates, for example, 
'It shall be the case that Tom (Dick, Harry) maximize 
G\V' implies (for each rational being) 'It shall be the 
case that Tom (Dick, Harry) does A., if he is in C1' 
and, indeed, the doubly general practical implication 
For all values of 'x,' 'it shall be the case that x maximizes 
GW' implies (for each rational being) 'it shall be the 
case that x does A1 if xis in C/.11 
43. Here the 'shall's are 'shall be the case's and though the 
egocentric 'I' has apparently dropped out, it is still present by 
virtue of the conceptual relationships between 'it shall be the 
case .. .' and 'I shall do .. .' 
44. The difference between the general hypothetical im-
peratives and the general practical implications schematized in 
42 lies in the fact that whereas the former authorize each person 
to reason about himself, thus 
I shall maximize GW 
So, I shall do A1 if in C1 
• The implications which are fonnulated in ordinary language as hrpothetical 
imperatives are fonnulated as 'ought to do's because the consequent mtentions 
are intentions to do: 
If one wants .•. , then one ought to do •••• 
On the other hand, the implications which we are now concerned are intentions 
that something be the case. They appear in the material mode of speech as 
hypothetical 'ought to be's thus 
If one wants X to be the case, Y ought to be the case 
e.g. 
If one wants a good crop, the soil ought to be moist. 
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the latter authorize each person to reason about anybody, in-
cluding, of course, himself. It authorizes Tom to reason about 
himself, thus 
It shall be the case that Tom maximizes G'V 
So it shall be the case that Tom does A., if inC, 
and also about Dick, thus 
It shall be the case that Dick maximize G\V 
So, it shall be the case that Dick does A., if inC,. 
VIII 
45. We are now ready for the thirty-two dollar question. 
We have been grooming categorical reasonableness to be the 
practical counterpart of truth. But in theoretical reasoning 
truth, and hence the goodness of arguments, is intermbjective. 
46. Consider the argument offered by Tom, 
There is lightning at t p 
So, there was thunder at t + A t so, q 
This is, we shall assume, not only valid given the familiar law 
of nature but good, i.e. it is true that there was lightning at t. 
47. If so, then Dick's argument 
There was no thunder at t + .6, t -q 
So, there was no lightning at t so, -P 
though equally valid, can't also be good. This is because Tom 
and Dick are contradicting one another, '''hen Tom says "p" 
and Dick says "-p". 
48. Tom's practical reasoning, 
It shall be the case that Dick maximizes G'V 
So, it shall be the case that Dick does A1 if inC, 
although it is valid, as being in a<:cordance with an implication 
which is binding on each rational being, is essentially private. 
In spite of the fact that Tom is reasoning validly about Dick, 
and that he would be reasoning with equal validity if he rea-
soned in the same way about anybody, including himself, his 
argument does not have the intersubjective status which would 
make possible a logical clash of his argument with Dick's equally 
valid argument 
It shall not be the case that Dick does A1 if in C1 
So, it shall not be the case that Dick maximizes GW. 
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Dick's 
It shall not be the case that Dick maximizes GW 
does not stand to Tom's 
It shall be the case that Dick maximizes GW 
as Dick's 
It is not the case that there was lightning at t 
stands to Tom's 
It is the case that there was lightning at t. 
49. Two people can affirm the same proposition in a strong 
sense of 'same'. But as far as the intentions we have so far con-
sidered are concerned, intentions can at best be parallel. They 
are irreducibly egocentric, even when this egocentricity is latent 
as in 
Tom: it shall be the case that the war ends 
Dick: it shall be the case that the war ends. 
This dialogue provides an excellent example of "agreement in 
attitude." But if the depth form of these statements is 
Tom: (Ceteris paribus) I (Tom) shall do what I can to 
end the war 
Dick: (Ceteris paribus) I (Dick) shall do what I can to 
end the war 
the agreement in attitude is not an identity of intention.10 
50. Whatof 
Tom: we shall do what we can to end the war 
Dick: we shall do what we can to end the war. 
These statements in the first person plural have the interesting 
properties that (a) they express the speaker's intention, yet (b) 
the intentions expressed are in the strongest sense the same. 
Put in terms of the distinctions I drew in my opening remarks, 
the intenditlgs are two in number, but the content of these in-
tendings is the same, in as strong a sense as the content of the 
two believings expressed by 
Tom: There was lightning at t 
Dick: There was lightning at t 
is the same. I shall put this by saying that the intendings ex-
pressed by 
10 It might be thought that since two people can use egocentric referring ex· 
prcssions and yet "make the same statement,'' the same might be true in the 
case of intentions. But egocentric referring expressions can be counterparts and 
hence used by different people to make the same statement (e.g. 'Jones is here 
by me': 'Jones is there by you'), because they gear in with an lntersubjective 
framework of relative location. 1f there were intersubjective intentions ••• , but 
then this is exactly the problem. 
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\Ve shall do ... 
have an intersubjective form. 
51. This intersubjective form stands out when it is a matter 
of intendings to do. When, however, it is a matter of intend· 
ings that something be the case, the distinction is likely to be 
lost, unless we index the 'shall' to indicate the form of the in-
tending to do which the intendings imply.11 Thus the inter· 
subjective intention expressed by 
It shall wE be the case that the war end 
would contrast in form, for example, with the personal intention 
It shallt be the case that the roses be planted. 
IX 
52. We have answered the thirty-two dollar question by 
finding the necessary dimension of intersubjectivity. There 
remains, however, the sixty-four dollar question of categorical 
reasonableness. Some paragraphs back, when we were beating 
about in the neighboring bushes, I asked if the antecedent of 
a certain complex hypothetical imperative could be construed 
as categorically reasonable or valid, pointing out that if so, its 
categorical reasonableness would be transmitted to that which 
is instrumentally implied. Since that time we have (a) taken 
into account intentions that something be the case, and (b) 
brought into the picture intentions which have intersubjective 
form. Have these additional resources brought us closer to our 
goal? I believe they have. 
53. Consider the intersubjectivc intention 
It shallw .. be the case that our welfare is maximized. 
If this intention were intrinsically categorically reasonable, or 
valid, then, by virtue of the relation of 'shall be the case' to 
'shall do,' so also would 
We shall each of us so act as to maximize our welfare. 
54. \Ve now take into account the vast number of compli-
cated instrumental nomologicals which we suppose to have been 
11 In the case of wishes as contrasted with intentions, we have the locution 
We would that ... 
to comrast with 
I would that ... 
Here the 'we' and 'I' ex~_>ress the Conn o£ the wish. In the case of intentions, 
however, it is only intenuons to do which exhibit this distinction. The function 
of the indices is perfonned in ordinary lan~uage by the contrast between "from 
a personal point of view" and "from the pomt of vtew of the group" or, of more 
interest, "from a moral point of view." 
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established (in principle) by the behaviorial sciences, and are 
represented by the schema 
'x so acts as to maximize GW' implies 'x does A1 if in C1'. 
Given these implications the categorical validity of the above 
intention entails the categorical validity of the family of inter-
subjective intentions 
It shall ... e be the case that each of us does A1 in C1 
·which, on our analysis, is equivalent to the family of ought 
statements 
If any of us is in C1 he ought to do A1• 
55. Notice that although the validity which these ought 
statements ascribe to the intersubjective intentions with respect 
to any of us that he do A1 in C1 is a de1·ivative validity, it is never-
theless a categorical validity. The 'ought' itself can properly 
be characterized as categorical, and contrasted with the 'rela-
tive' ought of the hypothetical imperative. 
X 
56. If the strategy sketched in the preceding paragraph were 
successful, we would have succeeded in vindicating Kant's 
analysis of the nature and validity of moral principles. But the 
strategy was only sketched, and any attempts to elaborate it 
must deal with two serious questions. 
57. The first is the most difficult. Who is 'us'? Kant believed 
himself to have established that 'we' must be "rational beings 
generally." At first sight, however, this seems to be a mistake, 
a confusion between the class of those for whom instrumental 
implications are binding, which does, indeed, consist of rational 
beings generally, and the class of those for whom categorically 
valid intersubjective intentions are binding. 
58. The distinction involved can best be made by returning 
to the general hypothetical imperatives of benevolence: 
'I shall maximize the GW' implies 'I shall do Ato if in C1'. 
\Ve pointed out that the scope of the 'I' consists of rational be-
ings generally, since the implications are simply the transposi-
tion into practical discourse of inductively established nomo-
logicals. We failed, however, to emphasize that the welfare to 
be maximized is the welfare of a group to which a particular 'I' 
belongs, thus, 
'I shall maximize the GW of my group' implies (for each 
rational being) 'I shall do At if inC,'. 
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And if we ask which group is that, we see that it by no means 
follows from the above that the answer must be 'rational beings 
generally.' We must draw at least a conceptual distinction be-
tween the class of those on whom the implications are binding, 
and the class of those the promotion of whose welfare is the 
object of the benevolent intention of a particular '1'. 
59. The distinction remains when we transpose the instru-
mental implication into the realm of intersubjective intentions. 
'It shallwc be the case that each of us so acts as to maximize 
om welfare' implies 'It shallwc be the case that each 
of us does AI if in cl·. 
As before, the 'implies' can be glossed with 'for each rational 
being.' But, as before, it by no means follows that the group 
whose welfare is 'our' welfare consists of rational beings gen-
erally. 
60. It might, however, be argued that only if the 'we' of 'our 
welfare' is the 'we' of 'we rational beings generally,' is an inter-
subjective intention of this form categorically valid. This might, 
as we snail see, be true if the welfare in question is what might 
be called epistemic welfare, but not if we take into account, as 
we must, needs and desires generally. 
61. Now the categorical validity of an intersubjectivc in-
tention of the form 
It shallwe be the case that our welfare is maximized 
would seem to consist in the fact that it is by virtue of such an 
intention that a group or community is a group or community. 
Roughly a community consists of individuals who intend sub 
specie such an intention, the scope of 'we' being the members of 
the community. 
62. This is not to say, of course, that there will be agreement 
as to just what is instrumentally implied by this intention, or 
that on particular occasions the implications a person believes 
it to have will prevail against an alternative arrived at by prac-
tical reasoning "from a personal point of view." 
63. Can we say that rational beings generally constitute a 
community? They would do so if they shared the intersubjec-
tive intention 
It shallwe be the case that each of us rational beings so 
acts as to promote our welfare. 
64. Now, since an individual can have an intention of inter-
subjective form even if no one else in point of fact shares it, an 
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individual rational being could have an intention of the above 
form even though few if any other rational beings had such an 
intention. To have this intention is to think of oneself as a 
member of a community consisting of all rational beings. It is 
possible, therefore, for a rational being to think of himself as a 
member of such community, even though this community does 
not actually exist. 
65. If, however, the following two premises were estab-
lished, this community could be shown to be a reality: 
(a) To think of oneself as a rational being is (implicitly) 
to think of oneself as subject to epistemic oughts binding 
on rational beings generally. 
(b) The intersubjective intention to promote epistemic 
welfare implies the intcrsubjective intention to promote 
welfare sans jJhmse. 
These premises would entail that the concept of oneself as a 
rational being implies the concept of oneself as a member of an 
ethical community consisting of all rational beings. To be sure, 
this implication need not be recognized. Indeed, it would take 
all the dialectical skill of a Socrates, a Hegel or a Peirce to bring 
it to the surface. Yet if the above premises were true, all 
rational beings would 'implicitly' think of themselves as mem-
bers of an ethical community consisting of all rational beings. 
But since a community exists if the relevant individuals think 
of themselves as its members, the ethical community of rational 
beings would have an 'implicit' existence. 
66. The first of the above premises is not implausible. If 
we accept it we can conclude that 'implicitly' all rational beings 
constitute an epistemic community. The second premise, de-
spite Peirce's valiant efforts, remains problematic, and without 
it the argument for the reality of an ethical community con-
sisting of all rational beings, the major premise of which is the 
"fact of reason," remains incomplete. 
XI 
67. I shall conclude by drawing the implications of the 
above analysis for certain traditional puzzles pertaining to 
Kant's ethical theory. For this purpose the most significant 
feature of this analysis is the point that the categorical validity 
of an intention can be derivative. 
68. It is this fact which enables us to see how 'teleological' 




Thus specific moral principles are categorical oughts, but the 
categorical validity of the intersubjective intentions that any 
rational being in a certain kind of circumstance do a certain 
kind of action12 is derivative from the categorical validity of the 
intersubjective intentions that our welfare be maximized. Thus 
when Kant speaks in the MetafJhysical Elements of Ethics of 
the happiness of others as a categorical end,13 what he says is 
in no way inconsistent with his claim that the ought of moral 
principles is categorical rather than the hypothetical ought 
which pertains to the relation of means to ends. 
69. Again, when Kant stresses intentions, he is not dis-
regarding consequences. It is because doing A1 in C1 maximizes 
the general welfare that the intention to do A1 in C1 is cate-
gorically valid. Of course we may be, and often are, mistaken 
about what kind of action in what kind of circumstance will 
promote the general welfare, but what we ought to do hinges 
on what would actually happen. On the other hand, the moral 
character of our motive is a function of what we think will 
happen as a result of our action, though not of this alone. 
70. \Vhen Kant insists that we ought to act from a sense of 
duty he is not making the absurd mistakes which have often 
been attributed to him.H He is simply repeating the point with 
which he opens the argument of the Fundamental Principles of 
Metaphysic of Morals, that the only unconditional good is a 
good will. By this he means that the only state of a person which 
is unconditionally good from a moral point of view is the dis-
position to act from a sense of duty. He has two points in mind: 
(a) Whereas action from any motive can have bad results, the 
sense of duty alone is such that only /Jy virtue of ignorance does 
it have bad results. Action from other motives even where 
ignorance is absent can lead to bad results. Thus the sense of 
duty is the only motive which has a direct conceptual tie to 
the categorically valid end of moral conduct. In this sense a 
good will is a categorical ought-to-be. (b) Although the general 
welfare is also an end in itself, a categorical ought-to-be, the 
u •.. this ."I ought" (Soller~) is properly an "I would" (Woller~), valid for every 
rational being, provided only that reason dctennined his actions without any 
hindrance" (Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Rea.son a11d Otlrer Works 011 
tire Theory of Ethics, tr. by Thomas K. Abbott. 6th ed. (London: Longmans, 
Green 8: Co., 1927), p. 68). 
••ibid., p. 303. 
" E.g., by Sir David Ross in Tire Riglrt and tl1e Good (Oxford: the Clarendon 
Press, 1930), p. 5. 
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ought-to-be of the happiness of any given individual is, Kant 
believes, conditional on his having a good will. 
71. As Broad has pointed out, Kant is not always clear about 
the respective status of specific categorical imperatives (cate-
gorically valid maxims) and higher order principles about what 
distinguishes categorically valid maxims from those which are 
not. Thus when he writes in The Critique of Practical Reason 
The principle of happiness may, indeed, furnish max-
ims, but never such as would be competent to be laws 
of the will even if universal happiness were made the 
object. For since the knowledge of this rests on mere 
empirical data ... it can supply only general rules, not 
tmive1·sal1r. 
he confuses the sound point that the intersubjective validity of 
the intention to maximize universal happiness cannot be ex-
plicated in terms of benevolence, with the unsound idea that 
empirical data are not relevant to determining the validity of 
specific categorical imperatives (general conditional intentions 
or maxims). The meta-ethical principle that those intentions 
of the form 
·we would that anyone did A1 if in C1 
are categorically valid which would be the legislation of an 
organized community of ideally rational beings qua motivated 
by the categorically valid intention to maximize the common 
good, does not absolve us from the necessity to use empirical 
data in our attempt to determine what ought to be done in 
particular kinds of circumstance. Any legislator, motivated 
by the common good, must ask questions of the form: what 
kind of action in this kind of circumstance would promote the 
common good? Only an omniscient legislator would not have 
to hedge his answers with 'probably' and 'for the most part.' 
72. Kant is insisting that the principles in terms of which 
the concept of a categorically valid intention is to be explicated 
are not empirical principles. They are a priori, and can, in 
principle, be known by a "mere analysis of the conceptions of 
morality."I6 The fallibility of moral philosophy is not the 
fallibility of empirical induction. 
73. The various so-called formulations of "the categorical 
imperative" are meta-ethical principles which locate categorical 
1° Kant. op. cit., p. 125. 
tG Ibid., P· 59. 
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imperatives (in the sense of specific categorically valid maxims) 
in the total structure of categorically valid intentions to which 
they belong. Thus the formulation in terms of legislation ap-
propriate to a 'Kingdom of Ends,' though it comes last, actually 
points to the derivability of categorically valid maxims from 
the intrinsically categorical intention that "all ends [be] com-
bined in a systematic whole (including both rational beings as 
ends in themselves, and also the special ends which each may 
propose to himsel£)."17 
74. The formulation "Act on maxims which can at the same 
time have for their objects themselves as universal laws of 
nature"18 reflects the logical relation between and and all. The 
intention-"from the moral point of view" or, as Kant would 
say "from the point of view of a rational being as such"-with 
respect to anybody that he do A1 in C1 doesn't entail the inten-
tion that everybody do At in C, (for we do not intend the im-
possible). It does, however, entail the wish that everybody did 
A1 in C1• Thus, a state of affairs in which everybody conforms 
to categorically valid maxims is itself a categorical ought-to-be, 
and the wish that it be the case a categorically valid wish. 
75. Finally, the principle that " ... each [rational being] 
must treat itself and all others never merely as means, but 
in every case at the same time as ends in themselves"19 re-
flects the fact that the intrinsically valid intention which is the 
prime mover of the domain of categorically valid intentions is 
the intersubjectively valid intention that each of us rational 
beings promote our common good. This state of affairs is an 
end-in-itself in which particular individuals appear symmetri-
cally as agents and patients in an ethical community. 
17 Ibid., p. 51. 
'"Ibid., p. 56. 
10 Ibid., p. 52. 
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. The .E. H. Lindley Memorial Lectureship Fu nd was established 
t~1 194 1 m memory of Ernest H . Lindley, Cha ncellor of th e Univer-
slly of J~a nsas from 1920 l0.1 939: ln Febru<try 19<!1 Mr. Roy Roberts, 
the cha trman of the committee m charge, suggested in the Gmduate 
Magazine that 
th e Chancellor shou ld invite to th e University for a lecture or 
a ser ies of lectures. some outstanding na tional or world figure 
to speak on "Values of L iving"-just as the late Chancellor 
proposed to d o in h is courses "T he Human Situa t ion" and 
" Plan for L iving." 
In the fo llowing June Mr. Roberts circu la ted a lcuer on beha lf of 
the Committee, proposing in somewhat broader terms that 
The income from this fund should be spent in a quest of 
socia l betterment by br inging to the University each year 
outstanding world leaders for a lecLUre or series of lectures, 
ye t with a design so broad in its outline tha t in the years to 
come. if it is deemed wise, this living memorial could take 
some more desirable form . 
T he fu nd was a llowed to accumula te until 1954, when Professor 
Richanl McKeon lccLUred on " Human Rights and Interna tional 
Relations." T he next lecture was given in 1959 by Professor Evere tt 
C. Hughes, and has been published by the University of Kansas 
School of Law as pa r t of his book Students' Culture and Perspec-
tives: Lectures on M erlicaf and General Educatiou. T he selection 
of IecLUrers for the Li ndley series has since been delegated to the 
Department of P h ilosophy. T he following lectures have been pub -
lished, and may be obtained from the Department at a price of 
fi fty cems each. 
I 961. ''The Idea of Man- An Outline of Philosophical Anthropology." 
By j ose Ferratcr ·Mora, Prok'Mor of Philosophy, Bryn Mawr College. 
1962. "Changes in Events and Changes in Things." 
By A. N. Prior, Professor of Philosophy, University of Manchester. 
1!)63. " Mora l Philosophy ami the Aualysis of Language." 
by Richard U. l\r:111d t . Pmfcs~n r of Philosophy. Swarthmore College. 
19f>4. " H uman Freedom and the Self." 
By Roderick M. Chisholm. ProfCl>'lllr of Philosophy, Rmwn Univerc; ity. 
1!>65. " Freedom of Mine!." 
By S111art Hampshi re, Profc:.sor of Philosophy, Princeton University. 
1966. "Some Beliefs about j ustice." 
By William K. Fr:mkcna, Pmfc<~.'IOT of Pbilo'lllphy. Unh·crsit)' of :.1ichigan. 
